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The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Techniques to Resolve Public Sector Bargaining 
Disputes 
 
CHARLES B. CRAVER*   
 
28 OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45 (2013) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Labor organizations have existed in the United States for over two 
centuries. In the late 1700s and early 1800s craft guilds consisting of skilled 
artisans operated apprenticeship programs and maintained professional 
standards.1 Such collective efforts were not confined to private sector 
personnel. During the 1830s, skilled craft workers employed at naval 
shipyards organized.2 In 1881 skilled craft guilds formed the Federation of 
Organized Trades and Labor Unions, which was transformed into the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) in 1886.3 During this same period, 
postal workers organized in a number of cities, and, in 1917, the AFL 
chartered the National Federation of Federal Employees.4 
During this same period, state and local government personnel began to 
organize. The Chicago Teachers Federation was established in 1898, and in 
1916, the AFL chartered the American Federation of Teachers.5 The 
International Association of Fire Fighters was chartered the following year.6 
Even though no state law authorized collective bargaining by government 
personnel prior to 1959, the American Federation of State, County & 
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1 See PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3–6 (1964). 
 
2 See MARTIN H. MALIN, ANN C. HODGES & JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 215 (West 2d ed. 2011). 
 
3 See TAFT, supra note 1, at 93–94, 113–16. 
 
4 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 215–16. 
 
5 See id. at 216. 
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Municipal Employees (AFSCME) was active throughout the 1930s and 
1940s.7 During this period, the percentage of government workers who were 
members of labor organizations ranged from nine percent to thirteen percent.8 
In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to enact a law authorizing 
public sector bargaining.9 Federal employees were provided with limited 
bargaining rights by President Kennedy in 1962 under Executive Order 
10,988.10 In the following years, many state legislatures enacted statutes 
enabling state and local government employees to organize and to bargain 
with their employers over their wages and working conditions. These 
bargaining laws enabled millions of government workers to join labor 
organizations. By the end of 2011, thirty-seven percent of government 
employees were union members.11 
Federal employees have enjoyed only limited bargaining rights, under 
Executive Orders 10,988 and 11,491 and Title VII of the Civil Service 
Reform Act,12 with Congress determining their basic wages and fringe 
benefits and managers determining basic departmental policies. On the other 
hand, most state and local government personnel have the right to bargain 
over their wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions.13 Although a few 
states have authorized work stoppages by non-essential government 
employees, most state laws have banned such job actions. A number of state 
laws preclude bargaining over the basic missions of the departments involved 
 
7 Id. at 217. 
 
8 Id. 
 
9 Id. at 227. 
 
10 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 228; Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 
C.F.R. 521 (1959–1963 Comp.). 
 
11 See Larry Swisher, Union Represented Workforce Stable in 2011, Ending Two-
Year Slides, BLS Says, DAILY LAB. REPT. (BNA) No. 18, D-1 (1/27/12). It is interesting 
to note that during this half century of public sector union growth, private sector union 
membership declined from almost 35% in the late 1950s to 6.9% by the end of 2011. See 
id.; MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 
Table 1 (1987). 
 
12 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7135 (2000). 
 
13 See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1371–
91 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) (summarizing the various state public sector 
bargaining laws and their impasse resolution procedures). 
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or the manner in which they carry out their functions.14 Nevertheless, public 
sector labor organizations have been able to negotiate bargaining agreements 
covering many important topics. 
 
II. IMPACT OF LABOR UNIONS ON WORKER RIGHTS 
 
The collective action of labor organizations has generally enhanced the 
economic benefits obtained by represented employees. Through the so-called 
“monopoly face,” unions have used their control over the supply of labor to 
increase wages and fringe benefits.15 The compensation earned by unionized 
workers tends to be five to twenty percent higher than the compensation 
earned by their nonunion cohorts.16 This is especially true in industries where 
union density is high. Unions have even had an indirectly positive impact on 
the compensation earned by nonunion workers, due to the fact that their 
employers provide them with more generous wages to discourage them from 
unionizing.17 
Representative labor organizations have also advanced the fringe benefits 
received by bargaining unit personnel.18 Unions have negotiated generous 
defined–benefit pension plans and expansive health care coverage for the 
persons they represent.19 Some have obtained employer-funded non-
occupational disability coverage, paid family and personal leave programs, 
and other similar fringe benefits. Most nonunion employees now have only 
defined–contribution pension plans and health care, coverage for which they 
must contribute substantial premiums and which have elevated deductibles 
and co-payments.  
Even though the economic benefits that unions obtain for represented 
employees are significant, it is important to recognize the critical non-
economic privileges provided by such entities. Almost all bargaining 
agreements stipulate that employees may only be disciplined for “just 
 
14 See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 
1384–90 (2009). 
 
15
 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 43–60 
(1984). 
 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at 150–54. 
 
18 See id. at 61–77. 
 
19
 See id. at 68-69. 
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cause.”20 In the absence of such contractual limitations, private sector 
workers––and even some public sector personnel––are employed on an at-
will basis, which means that they can be terminated at any time for almost 
any reason.21 Under other contractual provisions, layoffs, recalls, and 
promotions tend to be determined in a relatively objective manner. Least 
senior employees are laid off ahead of their more senior colleagues, and more 
senior individuals on layoff are recalled to work ahead of their less senior 
cohorts. When vacant positions are being filled, senior bidders often have 
priority ahead of equally qualified bidders with less seniority. 
A critical factor in bargaining agreements concerns the inclusion of 
grievance-arbitration provisions, which allow unit employees to challenge 
employer decisions that may have violated contractual provisions.22 Such 
clauses require labor and management representatives to work together to 
resolve their disputes through the negotiation process.23 In the rare instances 
in which mutual resolutions cannot be achieved, unions possess the right to 
invoke arbitration.24 Outside neutrals conduct hearings and determine if the 
employers have engaged in practices inconsistent with bargaining agreement 
provisions.25 Individuals without such contractual protections only have the 
“exit voice”––they either accept the decisions of their employers or look for 
work elsewhere.26 It is this “voice face,”27 which enables organized workers 
to meaningfully influence their basic employment conditions, that 
differentiates them from their nonunion cohorts. 
 
III. PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
 
 
20 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 13, at 930–32. 
21 See id. at 925–30. 
 
22 See id. at 197–276. 
 
23
 See id. at 199-201. 
24
 See id. at 240-49. 
25
 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 13, at 199-201. 
26
 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 15, at 7–11, 94–95. 
27 Id. at 94-95. 
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The vast majority of public sector contracts have been achieved through 
collective bargaining. Labor and management representatives work together 
to achieve mutually acceptable contracts. When bargaining discussions 
between the parties do not generate new contracts, the participants generally 
obtain mediator assistance. The neutral facilitators meet with the disputing 
parties to help them look for areas of agreement and to search for ways to 
deal with their areas of disagreement. These mediators induce the negotiating 
parties to go behind their stated positions to enable them to explore their 
underlying interests. Why does the union wish to obtain a particular term? Is 
there some other way in which the governmental employer might be able to 
satisfy the union’s concerns in a manner more acceptable to the government 
entity involved? 
When bargaining impasses occur, individuals employed in states 
authorizing work stoppages occasionally conduct strikes to advance their 
interests. As members of the general public become adversely affected by 
such job actions, they encourage their political leaders to seek appropriate 
resolutions. Even in states in which such work stoppages are unlawful, 
government employees may strike. Most of these stoppages do not go on for 
prolonged periods, and agreements are often achieved before courts are asked 
to enjoin the illegal job actions. 
When work stoppages are illegal or not desired by the workers involved, 
and mediator intervention has not generated new accords, the parties often 
resort to fact-finding or interest arbitration.28 Fact-finders conduct hearings 
and summarize the current positions of the parties.29 In some cases, they are 
empowered to make non-binding recommendations with respect to the 
manner in which they believe the conflicting terms should be resolved.30 The 
bargaining parties may accept these recommendations, but they frequently do 
not do so. They instead use the fact-finder’s conclusions and 
recommendations as a basis for continued negotiations.31 These efforts 
usually lead to final agreements. 
In some jurisdictions, binding interest arbitration procedures are used to 
resolve bargaining disputes.32 The management and labor representatives 
 
28
 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 614–15. 
29 See id.  
30
 See id. at 614.  
31
 See id.  
32 See id. at 615–43. 
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present their claims to an arbitral panel, which is empowered to determine 
the terms of the new bargaining agreement.33 Although some arbitral panels 
are authorized to determine the manner in which they think the disputed 
terms should be resolved, most laws compel the arbitrators to select either the 
final proposals of the government employer or the representative labor 
organization. This may be done on a whole package basis or on an item-by-
item basis. The panel is instructed to decide which party’s positions are more 
reasonable. 
 
IV. IMPACT OF LABOR IMPASSE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES ON 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MOVEMENT 
 
In the late 1960s, before I went to law school, I earned a master’s degree 
in labor law and collective bargaining. In the Collective Bargaining course 
we read A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,34 which described how 
labor and management representatives should employ integrative bargaining 
techniques to further their respective objectives. This innovative approach to 
negotiating had been developed in the early part of the last century by a 
business consultant named Mary Parker Follett.35 
To generate mutually efficient bargaining agreements, labor and 
management representatives must go behind their stated positions and 
explore their underlying interests. Which terms do union leaders desire that 
are not that significant to employers (e.g., union security clause), and which 
items do management officials value that are not that important to bargaining 
unit members (e.g., no-strike provision)? By ensuring that these terms end up 
on the appropriate side of the bargaining table, labor and management 
negotiators can generate the largest joint surplus and ensure the attainment of 
optimal accords.36 With respect to the items that are valued by both sides 
(e.g., wages and fringe benefits)––the so-called “distributive” terms––
bargainers are likely to employ more competitive tactics to enable them to 
claim a greater share of the surplus for their own side.37 
 
33
 See id. at 615. 
34 RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR 
NEGOTIATIONS (1965). 
 
35 See generally JOAN C. TONN, MARY P. FOLLETT: CREATING DEMOCRACY, 
TRANSFORMING MANAGEMENT 266–71 (2003). 
 
36
 See WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 34, at 52-53. 
37 See id. at 11–125. 
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In the Collective Bargaining course, we also explored the use of 
mediation to help parties achieve accords. We considered what the parties 
and the neutral facilitator did during the joint bargaining sessions, and what 
was done during the separate caucus sessions conducted by the mediator with 
each party alone. In the separate Labor Arbitration course, we considered 
both grievance arbitration, which concerns disputes arising during existing 
agreements claiming violations of specific contractual terms, and interest 
arbitration, which is used to resolve ongoing bargaining disputes over new 
contracts. 
When I became a law professor thirty-five years ago, I taught separate 
courses in Negotiation, Labor Law, and Collective Bargaining and Labor 
Arbitration. In my Negotiation course, I incorporated the integrative and 
distributive bargaining concepts I had learned in graduate school. When 
Getting to Yes38 was published, I was surprised to discover how many of the 
concepts described by Walton and McKersie were adopted by Fisher and 
Ury. 
One of the first books I worked on was the third edition of Collective 
Bargaining and Labor Arbitration.39 We described the bargaining process 
and the use of grievance-arbitration procedures to resolve disputes arising 
during the terms of collective contracts.40 The concepts covered were all 
based upon the practices that had been employed by labor and management 
representatives for many decades. When Russell Smith, Donald Rothschild, 
and Leroy Merrifield had created the first edition of that book in 1970, they 
had merely described how effectively these established dispute resolution 
practices functioned. 
I taught the Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration course for a 
number of years, until the decline in union membership shifted the 
pedagogical focus from collective labor relations law to individual 
employment rights. By that same time, academics not associated with labor 
and employment law had begun to appreciate the ways in which traditional 
labor-management dispute resolution procedures could be extended to other 
areas. They developed what has become known as alternative dispute 
resolution, primarily by building upon the procedures that had been 
employed for many decades in the labor-management field. When Edward 
                                                                                                                   
 
38 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). 
 
39 DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD, LEROY S. MERRIFIELD & CHARLES B. CRAVER, 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION (3d ed. 1988). 
 
40
 Id. at 757. 
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Brunet and I developed our own alternative dispute resolution book in 
1997,41 we did not think of this as an entirely new area. We had both served 
as mediators and arbitrators, and appreciated the fact that conventional labor-
management dispute resolution techniques were being incorporated in many 
other areas of legal practice. We thus find it interesting when alternative 
dispute resolution experts behave as if they have developed wholly original 
ways to resolve disputes, ignoring the procedures borrowed from well-
established labor-management practices.42 
 
V. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
 
For several decades, especially during the late 1980s and 1990s, the 
United States economy grew expansively. Wages and fringe benefits for both 
private and public sector workers increased––especially for union-
represented employees. These developments made unionized private sector 
employers less able to compete with nonunion firms, and caused many 
companies to export jobs to low-wage countries43 and to work diligently to 
induce their employees to decertify their representative labor organizations. 
Since government employers did not face such competitive issues, due to the 
monopoly aspect of most government-provided services, state and local 
government employers did not seek to eliminate representative unions. 
Many political leaders and their appointed administrators worked hard to 
court the support of public sector union leaders and their members. This was 
especially true in major union states like California, Illinois, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Politicians 
realized that they could not agree to excessive salary levels, both because of 
the immediate impact on government budgets and the fact that private sector 
workers would complain about such elevated public employee wages. They 
instead agreed to generous defined–benefit pension plans they thought would 
not become visible for many years in the future, and to expansive health care 
 
41 EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE (1997). 
 
42 See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Labor Unions on Worker Rights and Other 
Social Movements, 26 J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 267, 276–78 (2011) (describing the impact of 
labor movement on ADR procedures). 
 
43 See generally STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE (2008); THOMAS L. 
FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005). 
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programs, which did not have elevated premiums when they were initially 
implemented in the 1980s.44 
As the post-war baby boom generation moves into retirement over the 
next three decades, state and local governments will have to deal with the 
fact they have not set aside sufficient funds to cover the expensive pension 
costs that will be involved. Many of the bargaining agreements covering such 
persons continue to provide retirees and their dependents with supplemental 
Medicare coverage that will increasingly drain government coffers. 
Over the past four years, many unionized private sector unions have had 
to agree to wage freezes and, in some cases, even wage reductions. Many 
have accepted employer demands that future employees receive only 
defined–contribution pension payments instead of more generous defined–
benefit plan coverage. To retain meaningful health care protection, many 
labor organizations have had to accept increased deductibles and co-
payments, and elevated worker premium contributions. As a result of the dire 
economic situations facing many state and local governments due to rising 
costs and decreasing revenues, most government employers are going to have 
to address these same issues in the coming years. 
Several states have sought to avoid the need to address these critical 
issues at the collective bargaining table by reducing the scope of their 
bargaining statutes or through the complete repeal of such laws. These 
approaches are contrary to the basic principles of industrial democracy, and 
are entirely unnecessary. Public officials need to respect the right of 
government workers to have a collective voice, but must use the bargaining 
process to address these economic matters. 
Private sector concession bargaining is complicated by the fact that union 
leaders are political persons who do not wish to be voted out of office. 
Employers seeking wage and benefit curtailments have to allow the union 
negotiators to put on public performances, which can occasionally become 
offensive. They portray corporate leaders as greedy, and engage in 
aggressive bargaining tactics designed to convince their members that they 
are fighting hard to protect their interests. They may even have to generate 
short-term work stoppages that will remind their members how difficult it is 
to live with no income. In the end, they almost always acknowledge the 
economic realities and reluctantly accept the required reductions. 
Public sector bargaining is more complicated than private sector 
negotiating for two principal reasons. First, the absence of any profit motive 
makes it hard for employer representatives to demonstrate the true need for 
 
44 Some of these pension and health care plans were achieved through traditional 
collective bargaining. In states in which such fringe benefits are set by state legislators 
and are not subject to regular bargaining, union representatives used their negotiating 
skills to achieve such programs by way of lobbying efforts.  
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labor cost reductions. Most persons think that government entities can 
simply raise taxes to cover increased labor costs, unlike their private sector 
counterparts, which may be facing the real possibility of bankruptcy. The 
second factor concerns the fact that political leaders are on both sides of the 
bargaining table. Not only are the union leaders concerned about their 
reelection, but so are the government officials involved. If they do not 
achieve agreements minimizing increased labor costs, they may be forced to 
increase taxes, which is difficult to defend in a negative economic 
environment. On the other hand, if they demand too much from the union 
leadership, they may forfeit substantial labor contributions to their reelection 
funds and induce their workers to support other candidates in future 
elections. 
Despite the political risks associated with public sector bargaining during 
difficult times, states and municipalities should not restrict or eliminate their 
bargaining laws. They should instead use the procedures set forth in those 
statutes to achieve the results they require. In many cases, they should be 
able to accomplish their objectives through the normal bargaining process. In 
those situations where bargaining impasses are reached, they should employ 
modified alternative dispute resolution procedures to assist the bargaining 
parties. 
 
VI. USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO 
RESOLVE PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING DISPUTES 
 
The fundamental form of dispute resolution involves interparty 
negotiations. The two sides come to the bargaining table and work together 
to achieve mutually acceptable terms. Public employers often rush this 
process because they naively think that agreements should be generated 
expeditiously. They fail to appreciate the political nature of these 
interactions. Most public sector labor organizations lack significant 
bargaining power due to the no-strike provisions included in most state 
bargaining laws. As a result, much of what occurs is more akin to collective 
begging instead of collective bargaining. The union representatives state their 
demands and hope that politically friendly employer representatives will 
provide their members with decent employment terms. They recognize that if 
employer concessions are not forthcoming, there is little they can do at the 
bargaining table to compel position modifications. 
Public sector employers need to be patient and persevering. They should 
allow the bargaining process to develop in a deliberate manner. Most unions 
bring a number of national, regional, and local officials to bargaining 
sessions, and the primary spokespersons must put on shows for those 
individuals––and for the interested bargaining unit personnel. The more of a 
show put on by the labor representatives, the more likely it is that those 
persons recognize the fact they will have to give in to the employer positions. 
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Studies show that when people negotiate, they are more satisfied with 
objectively less beneficial terms when they think the bargaining process has 
been fair and they have been treated respectfully than when they are 
dissatisfied with the overall process.45 This is why government 
representatives must tolerate occasional union negotiator outbursts and allow 
the discussions to go on for prolonged periods.  
Rarely does a continuation of the status quo favor the workers. In most 
cases, a continuation of existing policies actually favors management. When 
government employers require minimal salary increases––or occasionally 
compensation reductions––changes in pension plans and increased employee 
contributions to health care coverage, the workers desire other non-monetary 
changes. Even when pension plans and health care coverage are not formally 
subject to bargaining resolution, government representatives should negotiate 
with union leaders about the political needs for the requested changes and 
endeavor to determine what they can provide to workers in exchange for the 
cost reductions being sought. Patient government negotiators should be able 
to trade the cost reduction terms they require for the non-monetary issues of 
interest to the other side. 
Government negotiators who need cost reductions must prepare 
thoroughly for their bargaining interactions. They must appreciate the fact 
that individuals are more negatively affected by losses than they are 
positively affected by gains.46 It is thus beneficial for government entities 
seeking reduced labor costs to emphasize the gains workers will obtain 
through these reductions––continued employment among them. If public 
employers propose layoffs if costs are not curtailed, most workers will be 
more amenable to the less disastrous reductions in wages or fringe benefits. 
Even persons who feel that their own positions are safe are likely to accept 
reasonable reductions that will protect the jobs of their colleagues. 
Government bargaining representatives must articulate their needs in a 
clear manner and demonstrate objectively why they require the terms they 
are seeking. They must listen carefully to union counteroffers and explore the 
underlying interests of the parties. A perfect example concerns the need to 
reduce expanding health care costs. Many employers initially seek an 
increase in worker premiums, unaware of the politically negative impact of 
such increases on union officials. Healthy employees dislike premium 
increases because such deductions decrease their take-home pay. On the 
 
45 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 412–20 
(2010); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 473, 473 (2008). 
 
46 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 304–05 (2011). 
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other hand, union leaders are often willing to accomplish the requisite cost 
savings through increases in worker deductibles and co-payments. When 
individuals require expensive medical treatment, they are relieved to have 
health care coverage. They generally accept the relatively minimal amounts 
they have to contribute to their total costs more readily than healthy persons 
accept increased premiums. Government employers may similarly work to 
replace expensive defined–benefit pension plans with less costly defined–
contribution plans by demonstrating to both workers and their representative 
unions the fact that they lack the financial resources to continue the defined–
benefit programs. 
When bargaining talks have continued for prolonged periods with 
minimal progress, the assistance of skilled mediators can be especially 
beneficial. If the parties have the opportunity to select their own neutral 
facilitator, they should look for someone who is a skilled and empathetic 
communicator and who understands the unique nature of public sector 
collective bargaining interactions. In other cases, the neutral participants will 
be selected by state mediation services. 
Mediation sessions are usually attended by the more significant party 
representatives, and they are conducted in private, which diminishes the need 
for either side to put on shows for their constituencies. During joint sessions, 
mediators ask many questions designed to explore the articulated issues and 
their underlying interests. They want to be sure that each side fully 
understands the reasons for the positions taken by the opposing party. When 
neither side seems amenable to compromise, they explore the underlying 
interests and try to induce brainstorming discussions that may generate 
options not contemplated by the bargaining parties. They hope to engender 
further bargaining discussions that may lead to mutual accords. The two 
factors which provide mediators with bargaining power include the fact that 
they have no authority to tell either side what to do and their complete 
neutrality.  
When joint sessions are not moving toward an agreement, either the 
mediator or the parties may suggest separate caucus sessions.47 The 
information each party receives during such discussions may not be 
communicated to the other side without the express consent of the speakers. 
In these separate sessions, mediators often ask each side what they should 
know that they have not already been told. This inquiry is designed to induce 
each side to let the mediators know what they are really concerned about. 
Sometimes labor or management representatives raise concerns that can 
easily be addressed, while at other times significant issues are brought up. In 
 
47 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 328–
30 (6th ed. 2009). 
 
 13 
the latter situations, the neutral facilitators must work with that party to 
look for options that would have the least negative consequences. 
In many bargaining circumstances, neither side is willing to modify its 
stated positions for fear the other party will not reciprocate its changes. 
Mediators can be of significant assistance in this regard. They can work to 
induce simultaneous position changes. When both sides seem hesitant to 
move in this manner, mediators can occasionally accomplish the desired 
result through conditional concessions.48 In separate caucus sessions, the 
neutrals ask the employer if it would increase its offer by specific amounts 
with respect to particular terms if the labor organization would agree to 
reciprocal reductions in its demands with respect to the same terms. The 
labor organization is then asked if it would decrease its demands if the 
employer would increase its offers. In this face-saving manner, mediators can 
slowly bring the parties together. This is why proficient mediators frequently 
help bargaining parties reach agreements they thought could not be achieved. 
When mediation efforts do not generate accords, fact-finding sessions 
can be helpful. These may be conducted by the persons who had already 
been serving as mediators due to their familiarity with the issues in dispute, 
or they may be conducted by different individuals who can only consider the 
information the parties decide to provide in formal hearings. The different 
sides explain their positions and the reasons supporting those proposals. The 
fact-finder then describes the party positions and determines the operative 
economic and factual circumstances. Even if the fact-finder is not 
empowered to issue any recommendations, his or her report can be helpful 
since it is likely to induce the parties to reexamine the validity of their 
underlying positions. 
In most cases where fact-finding is employed, the fact-finder is 
empowered to issue nonbinding recommendations indicating the way in 
which he or she believes the different terms should be resolved. This can be 
especially beneficial where the fact-finder’s report will be made public, 
because those recommendations can provide government and union 
negotiators “with the political cover they need to resolve their dispute.”49 If 
some reductions in services or tax increases, or both, are necessitated, the 
government representatives can blame the fact-finder, as can the union 
representatives when they have to explain to their constituents why they 
could not obtain more beneficial terms.50 The most significant drawback to 
 
48 Id. at 330–31. 
 
49 MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 614.  
 
50 In some cases, fact-finders are actually asked to make recommendations which 
reflect positions already tentatively agreed upon by the negotiating parties, but which 
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fact-finding concerns the fact that the neutral person’s recommendations 
are not binding. One or both sides can reject those suggestions and continue 
to fight for their own positions. 
In the relatively rare cases in which the bargaining parties are unable to 
achieve final accords with or without the assistance of mediators or fact-
finders, binding interest arbitration may be employed.51 Usually a panel of 
three arbitrators is created.52 The disputing parties present their final positions 
and the rationales supporting those positions. At the conclusion of the 
hearings, the arbitrators decide the final terms of the new contract. They may 
be authorized to resolve the controverted issues in any manner they think 
appropriate, based upon factors set forth in the applicable bargaining 
statute,53 but in many instances they are required to determine which party’s 
submitted positions are more reasonable. Providing arbitrators with broad 
discretion to determine the new contract terms often results in compromise 
awards, which provide the public employers with some issues and the 
representative unions with other items.54 
In some cases, the arbitrators must compare the final party offers on a 
complete package basis. They examine all of the proposed terms and decide 
which total package is more reasonable. The fact that the arbitrators must 
select the entire package of either the employer or the labor organization 
deprives them of any way to split the different terms. On the other hand, this 
all-or-nothing approach may result in the imposition of individually 
unreasonable terms that are included within the more reasonable total 
package of one party. 
To avoid this difficulty, many state bargaining laws authorize the 
arbitrators to determine the reasonableness of the respective party final offers 
on an issue-by-issue basis. The neutrals examine each proposed term 
separately and decide which one is more reasonable. This approach enables 
the arbitrators to reject particular proposals they do not consider appropriate. 
On the other hand, it encourages arbitration panels to award some terms to 
                                                                                                                   
they are hesitant to announce themselves––fearing political repercussions if they must 
take personal responsibility for those terms. 
 
51 See MALIN, HODGES & SLATER, supra note 2, at 615–74. 
 
52 In some cases, the person who served as the mediator is either designated as the 
lone interest arbitrator or as the head of the arbitration panel. Such a mediation/arbitration 
procedure can be beneficial due to the fact that the principal decisionmaker is thoroughly 
familiar with the underlying circumstances and the actual positions of the parties. 
 
53 See id. at 625–43. 
 
54 See id. at 643. 
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the public employer and others to the representative union in an effort to 
satisfy both sides. It also encourages the bargaining parties to include some 
unimportant––and often unreasonable––items in their final offers they hope 
arbitrators will reject in favor of other terms they really desire.55  
Issue-by-issue arbitration tends to achieve results similar to those the 
parties should have been able to generate through collective bargaining 
procedures. By rejecting the less reasonable terms in favor or the more 
reasonable terms and by effectively trading some terms for other issues, 
arbitrators do exactly what disputing parties do when they resolve conflicting 
positions through conventional bargaining. As a result, it does not seem 
unreasonable for arbitrators to possess the authority to divide the different 
items in such a compromising fashion. 
Economically weak labor organizations have a strong incentive to resort 
to binding interest arbitration to resolve their bargaining controversies. This 
is based on the fact that the worst they could do is end up with the final offers 
articulated by the public employers. On the other hand, since many 
arbitration panels try to accommodate both sides when they are authorized to 
determine the different items on an issue-by-issue basis, the unions generally 
obtain more than they were able to claim at the bargaining table. Rational 
union leaders would be irrational if they did not take advantage of this aspect 
of the interest arbitration process. 
To offset the fact that unions cannot lose under current interest 
arbitration procedures by going to arbitration, states might consider changes 
in their statutes that would encourage both parties to work out their 
differences at the bargaining table. They could provide that when arbitral 
panels determine under issue-by-issue procedures that the public employer’s 
final proposals are more reasonable than those articulated by the labor 
organization, they could subtract the difference––or perhaps one-half or one-
quarter the distance––between the final offers of the union and the final 
offers of the government employer from their awards with respect to those 
issues. The legislature could similarly provide that when the final offers of 
the representative union are found to be more reasonable than those of the 
public entity, the panel must add that difference––or one-half or one-quarter 
that distance––to the awards pertaining to those terms.  
This approach would have two significant benefits. First, it would negate 
the no-loss incentive of representative labor organizations to invoke 
arbitration on a regular basis, since they cannot presently do worse than what 
they have already been offered. They would have to carefully weigh the 
possibility they could end up with less generous final terms through 
arbitration than they are being offered at the bargaining table. Second, such 
an approach would greatly encourage labor and management representatives 
 
55 See id. at 649. 
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to make final offers that are truly rational given the current economic 
circumstances affecting the negotiating parties. This would bring the parties 
closer together and enhance the likelihood they would achieve mutually 
acceptable terms through their own bargaining efforts. 
The most significant criticism of public sector interest arbitration 
concerns the fact that politically unaccountable outsiders make 
determinations that affect both city and state budgets and the manner in 
which important government services are to be provided.56 Unlike grievance 
arbitration proceedings, which only involve the interpretation of contractual 
terms agreed upon by the parties themselves, interest arbitration proceedings 
enable external neutrals to decide what the actual terms of future contracts 
will be. This provides these arbitrators with significant authority. On the 
other hand, such arbitral determinations are almost always constrained by the 
final proposals submitted by the bargaining parties. The arbitrators are not 
authorized to impose conditions not explored by the parties themselves.  
States have two ways to avoid interest arbitration. They could repeal or 
limit public sector bargaining laws in a way that deprives outside neutrals of 
authority over basic terms of employment. A perfect example is provided by 
the federal government, which severely limits the scope of bargaining to 
items not related to wages and fringe benefits and which do not concern the 
basic mission of the agencies involved. While this approach might be 
politically popular during difficult economic times, it is contrary to the 
notion of industrial democracy. Most of the problems currently affecting 
government employers with bargaining laws are not due to the statutes 
themselves, but to the tendency of political leaders to curry favor with union 
officials. If they had the courage to stand up to labor negotiators when 
necessary to advance government interests, these problems could be 
minimized. 
At the other extreme, states could authorize public sector work 
stoppages––at least for non-essential personnel. Most strikes would not 
continue for prolonged periods due to the fact that most persons today lack 
the finances to support themselves for more than brief periods without 
defaulting on their economic obligations. In addition, if members of the 
public thought the union demands were excessive, they could encourage their 
government employers to hold the line at the bargaining table. On the other 
hand, if they were unwilling to withstand longer shutdowns or thought the 
workers deserved enhanced employment conditions, they could encourage 
their political leaders to grant the workers the increases being sought. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
56 See Malin, supra note 14, at 1370–74 (discussing argument that public sector 
bargaining laws have anti-democratic impact). 
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Labor organizations have existed in the United States for many decades. 
Private sector unions have used collective bargaining procedures and 
occasional work stoppages to enhance the wages and fringe benefits of 
bargaining unit personnel and to protect such persons from unfair treatment. 
As states have enacted public sector bargaining statutes enabling their own 
employees to unionize and bargain collectively, government personnel have 
improved their employment conditions. 
For over one hundred years, private sector employers and representative 
labor organizations have used the bargaining process to achieve collective 
agreements. When negotiation difficulties have been encountered, the two 
sides have employed mediation assistance to assist them. To resolve issues 
that have developed during the terms of existing contracts, disputants have 
employed grievance–arbitration procedures to initially negotiate with each 
other. In the relatively few cases in which mutual resolutions could not be 
achieved, arbitration hearings have been conducted. Over the past three 
decades, individuals have developed the alternative dispute resolution 
movement, which borrowed most of its procedures from these well-
established labor–management practices. 
Deteriorating economic conditions have forced government employers to 
look for ways to slow the growth of––or even reduce––the high cost of labor. 
Generous defined–benefit pension plans are not adequately funded, and the 
cost of expansive health care coverage has risen much faster than the 
Consumer Price Index. Politically accountable government representatives 
do not dare to raise taxes very much, nor do they wish to offend powerful 
public sector labor organizations by demanding cost reductions at the 
bargaining table. As a result, several state legislatures have reduced the scope 
of public sector bargaining laws, or repealed them entirely. Instead of 
resorting to such drastic measures, government entities should employ 
alternative dispute resolution techniques to deal with their bargaining 
problems. 
They should initially use the traditional bargaining process to obtain the 
changes they require. They must appreciate the political nature of labor 
leaders and allow union representatives to prolong bargaining talks in a 
manner that would enable them to put on shows for their members. When 
interparty negotiations begin to falter, mediation assistance would be 
beneficial. If agreements still cannot be generated, fact-finders can help to 
determine the underlying economic issues and recommend solutions they 
think appropriate. 
When government employers and labor leaders are still unable to reach 
accords, many states employ binding interest arbitration. Arbitration panels 
conduct hearings and determine how the different terms should be resolved. 
Most often, arbitral panels must select the more reasonable final proposals 
set forth by the two sides––either on a total package basis or on an issue-by-
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issue basis. Since labor unions have nothing to lose by undermining the 
bargaining process and waiting until they can invoke interest arbitration, 
legislatures could direct the panels to reduce their awards to the extent, or 
partial extent, that less reasonable union demands exceed the more 
reasonable employer offers. Arbitration panels could similarly be directed to 
increase their awards to the extent, or partial extent, that the less generous 
employer positions fall below the more reasonable union positions. 
It is ironic that the alternative dispute resolution procedures being 
suggested to resolve current public sector bargaining impasses are the 
equivalent of the procedures which labor and management representatives 
have employed for many decades. This truly demonstrates that the more 
things change, the more they remain the same. 
